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Case No. 20070940-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Charles Moa, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This is a consolidated appeal from two separate cases. The case numbers are 
031903971 and 071904352. For convenience, the State will refer to the cases as -3971 
and -4352. The State will cite to the records as R. 3971 at and R. 4352 at . 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
In case -3971, defendant pleaded no contest to one count of discharging a 
firearm from a vehicle, a third degree felony. In case -4352, defendant pleaded 
guilty to one count of discharging a firearm from a vehicle, one count of aggravated 
assault, and one count of failing to stop at the command of a police officer, all third 
degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err when it denied defendant's motion to withdraw his 
plea in case -3971, where defendant's counsel repeatedly discussed the plea with 
defendant, defendant signed a statement attesting that he understood the elements 
of the crime, and the court strictly complied with rule 11 prior to accepting the plea? 
Standard of Review. "The ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly 
complied with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea 
is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, 
f 10, 983 R2d 556 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences 
in case -4352, where defendant drove the car during a drive-by shooting in a 
residential neighborhood, defendant intentionally rammed a police car during the 
ensuing high speed chase, and where this crime occurred while defendant was 
awaiting sentencing on the shooting at issue in case -3971? 
Standard of Review. "The trial court has substantial discretion in conducting 
sentencing hearings and imposing a sentence, and we will in general overturn the 
trial court's sentencing decisions only if we find an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 2004): 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon 
leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401 (West 2004): 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances 
of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, 
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case -3971 
On June 13, 2003, defendant was charged with three counts of aggravated 
assault. R. 3971 at 1-3. On May 25,2007, defendant pleaded no contest to one count 
of discharging a firearm from a vehicle, a violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-
508 (West 2004). R. 3971 at 71-72. At the plea hearing, the parties specified that 
defendant was admitting that he had fired toward a building, which was a third 
degree felony under § 76-10-508(2)(b). R. 3971 at 226: 2.1 
1
 Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-508 was substantively amended in 2008, but 
defendant pleaded guilty under the version of the statute set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-10-508 (West 2004). Unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 
76-10-508 are to that version of the statute. 
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Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his plea. R. 3971 at 127-
29. Following argument, the court denied that motion. R. 3971 at 195-97. 
Defendant was sentenced on October 29,2007, and timely appealed. R. 3971 at 193, 
205. 
Case -4352 
On June 15,2007, defendant was charged with seven counts of discharging a 
firearm from a vehicle, one count of aggravated assault, one count of failing to 
respond to an officer's commands, and one count of failing to stop at an officer's 
command. R. 4352 at 2-5. On November 13,2007, defendant pleaded guilty to one 
count of discharging a firearm from a vehicle, one count of aggravated assault, and 
one count of failing to stop at an officer's command. R. 4352 at 73-74. Defendant 
was sentenced on January 11, 2008, and timely appealed. R. 4352 at 90-94. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case -39712 
On April 4,2003, defendant and several friends approached a group of people 
in an Office Max parking lot, told them that the "area was Glendale TCG (Tongan 
Crip Gang) territory/' pulled out handguns, and fired several shots at them as they 
ran away. R. 3971 at 112:3. One witness later said that "the shooters appeared to be 
shooting randomly towards the crowd and towards the ground." R. 3971 at 112: 3. 
Another witness told police that he heard approximately nine gunshots. R. 3971 at 
112: 3. One of the bystanders was struck in the calf by a bullet. R. 3971 at 112: 3. 
An arrest warrant was issued for defendant on June 13, 2003, but defendant 
left the state and did not return to Utah for his initial appearance until January 2, 
2
 The facts in this case are taken from the PSI. R. 3971 at 112:3. Defendant did 
not challenge those facts when given the opportunity to do so at his sentencing 
hearing. R. 3971 at 234: 29-30. "If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the 
presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be 
considered to be waived." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(b) (West 2004). Utah courts 
have accordingly accepted the factual assertions made in a PSI as true when the 
defendant failed to specifically contest those assertions at sentencing. See, e.g., State 
v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994). 
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2007. R. 3971 at 4-6.3 After defendant's first two public defenders were conflicted 
out, James Valdez entered a notice of appearance on March 8, 2007. R. 3971 at 41. 
Defendant was initially charged with three counts of aggravated assault. R. 
1-3. But the State ultimately offered defendant and a co-defendant a deal: if the 
defendants would plead no contest to discharging a firearm from a vehicle, the State 
would recommend a suspended sentence of 0-5 years in prison, with credit for time 
served, and the State would also agree to not bring additional charges stemming 
from the incident. R. 3971 at 227: 4,12. 
Valdez negotiated this plea agreement with the State and filled out a plea 
statement in anticipation of the plea hearing. R. 3971 at 226: 5; 3971 at 227: 11. 
Before defendant agreed to the deal, however, Valdez filed a motion to withdraw as 
counsel. R. 55. 
On April 24, 2007, Manny Garcia appeared as defendant's counsel. R. 63. 
After appearing, Garcia discussed the deal with James Valdez to confirm that the 
plea statement was accurate. R. 3971 at 227: 12. Garcia also discussed the plea 
3
 During the intervening months, defendant was charged with assault in 
Washington in November 2003, obstruction of justice and vandalism in California in 
May 2005, assault in Washington in June 2005, and possession of marijuana with 
intent to distribute in California in November 2006. R. 3971 at 112: 6-7. 
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statement with defendant to make sure that defendant understood the agreement 
R. 3971 at 227:11-12. 
Defendant ultimately decided to accept the agreement. But there was a 
problem: defendant's accomplice in this case had already accepted the deal and 
been released from jail by the time defendant pleaded no contest. R. 3971 at 227:12-
14,17. Defendant had been arrested approximately 21 days after his co-defendant, 
however, and the State now insisted that defendant agree to serve an additional 
period in jail to bring his sentence in line with what his co-defendant had served. R. 
3971 at 227: 12-14, 17. Defendant wanted to get out of jail that day, however, so 
Garcia approached the prosecution and negotiated an amended agreement: the 
underlying sentence would be changed from 0-5 years to 3-5 years, and defendant 
would agree to a PSI before sentencing; in exchange, the State would agree that 
defendant could be released that day, rather than serving the extra time required to 
bring his sentence in line with his co-defendant's. R. 3971 at 227: 12-14. The 
prosecution also agreed that it would not be filing any "related charges." R. 3971 at 
75. Garcia discussed these alterations with defendant, and defendant specifically 
agreed to them. R. 3971 at 227:13-14. 
On May 25,2007, defendant appeared in court and entered his plea. R. 3971 
at 71-72. Defendant submitted a written plea statement in support of his plea. R. 
7 
3971 at 75-82. The plea statement repeatedly identified the offense to which 
defendant was pleading no contest, both by name and its code designation. R. 3971 
at 75-76. Immediately above one such reference, defendant stated: "I understand 
the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no 
contest)/7 R. 3971 at 76. Defendant then twice confirmed that he was "admitting 
that [he] committed the crimes listed above." R. 3971 at 76, 78. 
Defendant's statement also confirmed that he had consulted with his attorney 
before his plea. Defendant stated: "My attorney and I have fully discussed this 
statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s)." R. 
3971 at 77. Defendant and Garcia both signed the statement. R. 3971 at 80. 
At the sentencing hearing, the parties explained the plea to the court. At one 
point in the hearing, the court asked counsel "[w]hat section will he be charged 
under, do you know?" R. 3971 at 226:4. The prosecutor responded that it would be 
"[s]ection 76-10, I believe it's 508, isn't it counsel?" R. 3971 at 226: 4-5. Garcia 
responded by saying "I honestly don't know. I looked at it a few days ago and I did 
not write it down, Judge." R. 3971 at 226: 5. The prosecutor then confirmed that 
defendant was pleading no contest to violating Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-508. 
R. 3971 at 226: 6. 
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The trial court conducted a rule 11 colloquy in which it confirmed that 
defendant was sober and not acting under any compulsion, as well as that 
defendant understood his rights and potential punishments. R. 3971 at 226: 6-9. 
When the court asked defendant if he had any questions, defendant had none 
regarding the crime to which he was pleading. R. 3971 at 226: 10. Instead, 
defendant said that his only concern was that there would be "no other prosecution 
after this. That's all I wanted to know." R. 3971 at 226:10-11. The court accepted 
defendant's plea. R. 3971 at 226: 6-10. 
Shortly after the plea, the prosecution filed charges against defendant for 
witness tampering. R. 3971 at 227: 6-7. Although those charges were subsequently 
dropped, R. 3971 at 227: 6-7; R. 3971 at 234:20, defendant wrote several handwritten 
letters to the court asking for leave to withdraw his plea. R. 3971 at 101-06. In those 
letters, defendant complained about the retaliation charge and claimed that he had 
not approved the alterations to the plea agreement. R. 3971 at 101-06. 
On July 31,2007, Garcia filed a motion to withdraw as defendant's counsel. R. 
3971 at 107-08. Defendant's new counsel appeared on August 21, 2007, and filed a 
motion to withdraw defendant's plea that same day. R. 3971 at 124-28. In that 
motion, defendant again claimed that the plea was invalid because of the alterations 
to the plea and the subsequent retaliation charge. R. 3971 at 127-28. Defendant did 
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not mention rule 11, nor did he ever claim that he had not understood the elements 
of the charge to which he had pleaded. R. 3971 at 127-28. 
On October 5, 2007, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to 
withdraw his plea. R. 3971 at 227:1-24. During that hearing, defendant agreed that 
his motion was limited to the plea alterations and the retaliation charge, and he 
therefore stipulated that rule 11 was not at issue. R. 3971 at 227: 7, 18-19. 
Defendant likewise agreed that because the retaliation charge had been dismissed, it 
was no longer at issue. R. 3971 at 227: 6-7. Given this, the trial court's written ruling 
ultimately concluded that the parties had "stipulated that the plea taken on May 25, 
2007, was taken in compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure." R. 3971 at 195. The court then rejected defendant's motion on its 
merits. R. 3971 at 195-97; R. 3971 at 227: 20-22. 
Case -43524 
While awaiting sentencing on the shooting at issue in case -3971, defendant 
was involved in another shooting, this time in a residential neighborhood. In this 
shooting, defendant drove into a Salt Lake City neighborhood at 5 a.m., after which 
4
 The PSI in case -4352 is located in a non-paginated manila folder. The State 
will cite to it as R. 4352 at PSI: . As with the PSI in case -3971, defendant did not 
challenge the accuracy of the facts contained in this PSI prior to sentencing, and 
those facts are therefore accepted as true. 
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one of his passengers "began shooting" from the vehicle at a neighborhood house. 
R. 4352 at PSI: 3. Officers later found "several bullet holes in a vehicle" that was 
parked in front of a home. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4. 
Two citizens saw the shooting occur, and one of them followed defendant as 
he left the neighborhood. R. 4352 at PSI: 3. Officers subsequently joined the pursuit 
and "attempted to perform a traffic stop on the vehicle." R. 4352 at PSI: 3. That 
attempt failed, and defendant then led "officers on a high-speed chase at speeds 
reaching 125 to 130 mph. During the police chase [defendant] intentionally crashed 
head-on into one of the patrol vehicles and continued to flee. Officers eventually 
forced [defendant] to stop using the 'pit maneuver/" R. 4352 at PSI: 3.5 
After defendant's vehicle was stopped, defendant fled on foot. R. 4352 at PSI: 
4. Defendant ignored officers' commands to stop, and officers had to tase him twice 
before they were able to arrest him. R. 4352 at PSI: 4. 
5
 A pit maneuver "is a method used by police to force a pursued vehicle to 
abruptly turn sideways to the direction of travel, by bumping the back side of 
the pursued vehicle with the police vehicle, causing the fleeing driver to lose 
control and stop. 'PIT' stands for either 'Precision Immobilization Technique/ 
'Pursuit Intervention Technique/ or 'Parallel Immobilization Technique/ 
depending on the police department using it." United States v. Bazaldua, 506 F.3d 
671, 673 n.2 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 
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Defendant was initially charged with seven counts of discharging a firearm 
from a vehicle, one count of aggravated assault, one count of failing to respond to an 
officer's commands, and one count of failing to stop at an officer's command. R. 
4352 at 2-5. On November 13, 2007, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of 
discharging a firearm from a vehicle, one count of aggravated assault, and one count 
of failing to stop at an officer's command. R. 4352 at 73-74. 
Defendant was sentenced on January 11,2008. R. 4352 at 122:1-7. During the 
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor offered "to give a little bit of background as to 
what occurred at this home." R. 4352 at 122:5. The prosecutor explained that there 
had been a prior shooting at the home earlier in the year in which a young girl had 
been hit. R. 4352 at 122: 5. After relating the facts of the shooting at issue here, the 
prosecutor argued that defendant is "extremely dangerous." R. 4352 at 122: 6. The 
prosecutor further explained that" [t]here's not just one victim in this case. This is a 
whole neighborhood who had multiple shootings, and finally got Mr. Moa because 
the citizens were willing to step up and put their own lives in danger." R. 4352 at 
122: 6. Defendant did not object to any of these statements. 
The court sentenced defendant and ordered his sentences to run 
consecutively, both to each other and to any other sentences defendant had from 
other cases. R. 4352 at 122: 7. The court explained its ruling by simply stating that 
12 
defendant is "an extreme danger to any community that he happens to be in." R. 
4352 at 122: 6. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant claims the trial court did not strictly comply with rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, when it took his plea in case -3971. As a result of 
this alleged violation, defendant asks this Court to either reduce his sentence or 
instead allow him to withdraw his plea. This claim should be rejected for three 
reasons. 
First, contrary to defendant's claim, a defendant is not entitled to withdraw a 
plea based only on a technical rule 11 violation. Instead, a defendant is only entitled 
to withdraw a plea if the plea was entered unknowingly and involuntarily. 
Defendant's claim in this case is therefore predicated on an incorrect legal standard. 
Second, there was no plain error in this case because defendant's plea was not 
obviously unknowing and involuntary. During the proceedings below, defendant 
repeatedly confirmed that the trial court had complied with rule 11, thereby creating 
a presumption that the plea was proper. The record confirms this, conclusively 
showing that defendant understood both the nature of the charges and the likely 
consequences of his plea. Moreover, defendant has not been prejudiced because he 
has not shown that he would not have pleaded had the elements all been recited at 
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the sentencing hearing. Defendant therefore should not be granted relief in this 
case. 
Third, defendant's ineffective assistance claim should also be rejected. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the record shows that defendant's counsel did 
investigate the case prior to the plea hearing, and it also shows that defendant's 
counsel discussed the charges with defendant before the hearing. Moreover, 
defendant has not shown that he would not have pleaded but for the alleged errors. 
Point II: Defendant next claims that the trial court abused its discretion by 
ordering his sentences in case -4352 to run consecutively to each other and to the 
charges at issue in case -3971. Defendant specifically claims that the court erred by 
improperly considering two statements made by the prosecutor during the 
sentencing hearing. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, however, the record does not show that the 
trial court considered either statement as a basis for its sentencing decision. The 
record instead shows that the court ordered defendant's sentences to run 
consecutively because of defendant's dangerous character. This decision was amply 
supported by the indiscriminate, violent nature of the charged offenses, as well as 
by defendant's extensive criminal history. Defendant's claim therefore fails. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANTS PLEA WAS BOTH KNOWING AND 
VOLUNTARY, AND DEFENDANT IS THEREFORE NOT 
ENTITLED TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA IN CASE -3971 
Defendant claims that his plea was invalid because the trial court did not 
comply with rule 11 during the plea colloquy. Aplt. Br. 18-37. According to 
defendant, the trial court specifically violated rule 11 by failing to inform defendant 
that the crime of discharging a firearm from a vehicle contained an intent element. 
Aplt. Br. 20-29. Defendant then claims that he would not have pleaded guilty had 
he been informed about this particular element. Aplt. Br. 31-33. 
"A general rule of appellate review . . . is that a contemporaneous objection 
or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the 
trial record before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal/' State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). 'The objection must be specific enough to 
give the trial court notice of the very error of which counsel complains." State v. 
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (quotations and citation omitted). The 
purpose of this requirement is to afford the lower courts an "opportunity to correct 
the errors if appropriate/' State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993) 
(quotations and citation omitted). "To serve these policies,... the preservation rule 
15 
applies to every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can 
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11,10 P.3d 346 (citations omitted). In addition, courts can 
also review unpreserved claims if the lack of preservation was due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel. State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49,118,122 P.3d 566. 
Defendant acknowledges that he did not raise this claim below, but 
nevertheless argues that this error can be reviewed for either plain error or 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Aplt. Br. 29-37. Defendant's claim should be 
rejected for three reasons. First, contrary to defendant's claim, rule 11 does not 
provide a basis for withdrawing a plea. Second, there was no plain error in this case 
because defendant understood the elements of the crime to which he was pleading. 
Third, defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel because his 
attorney did not perform deficiently. 
A. Contrary to defendant's claim, rule 11 does not provide a basis for 
withdrawing a plea. 
"A 'withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a privilege, not a r ight . . . [and] is within 
the sound discretion of the trial court.'" State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, |^ 9 ,1 P.3d 
1108 (quoting State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987)). Once a plea is 
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entered, a defendant is only entitled to withdraw the plea if he shows that the plea 
was taken in violation of either his constitutional or statutory rights. 
Under the constitutional standard, a defendant's plea can be withdrawn if it 
was unknowingly or involuntarily entered. See, e.g., Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 
992 (Utah 1993); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 670-72 (Utah App. 1993). This 
standard requires that a defendant receive "real notice of the true nature of the 
charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due 
process/' Salazar, 852 P.2d at 991. Moreover, a defendant must also be informed of 
"the direct consequences of [his] guilty plea/7 State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App 381,^ f 
21 n. 9 (quotations, citations, and emphasis omitted); accord State v. Gonzales, 2005 
UT App 5 3 8 , \ 8,127 P.3d 1252. 
The statutory standard for withdrawing a plea is set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 2004). Prior to 2003, this statute allowed a defendant to 
withdraw a plea for "good cause." See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004), 
Historical and Statutory Notes. Utah courts interpreted this good cause standard to 
include rule 11 violations. State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819,821-22 (Utah App. 1995); State 
v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 
569 (Utah App. 1994). 
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The pre-2003 statutory standard was therefore distinct from the constitutional 
standard, which did not depend on whether the trial court had strictly complied 
with rule 11. See Stilling, 856 P.2d at 671; Salazar, 851 P.2d at 991-92. In Salazar, for 
example, the supreme court held that the knowing and voluntary standard sets 
forth a "more limited" inquiry than that which is required by rule 11, and "a failure 
to comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking a guilty plea" therefore "does not" render a 
plea unknowing and involuntary. Id. at 992. 
In 2003, however, the Utah Legislature removed the "good cause" provision 
from § 77-13-6 and replaced it with the constitutional standard. Under the current 
statute, a plea can now be withdrawn "only upon leave of the court and a showing 
that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6. 
As indicated by the plain language of the statute, the 2003 amendment was 
designed to align the statutory standard with the constitutional standard. The 
amendment's legislative history supports this view. When the amendment was 
presented to the Legislature, its two legislative sponsors both explained that the 
constitutional standard would now become the statutory standard as well. When 
Representative Katherine Bryson, the bill's primary sponsor, introduced the bill to 
the Utah House of Representatives, she explained its purpose as follows: 
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The current statute permits the withdrawal of a guilty plea only upon 
good cause shown. . . . What the constitution requires is that the plea 
be made knowingly and voluntarily, and rule 11 should actually create 
a safe harbor and not be the standard by which withdrawal is 
determined. [H.B.] 238 would correct some problems by permitting 
defendants to withdraw their pleas only on a showing that the plea 
was not knowing and voluntary. It's a constitutional standard and the 
standard on post-conviction challenges. 
Representative Katherine Bryson, Floor Debate on H.B. 238,2003 Utah Legislature, 
February 28, 2003, audio file located at ht tp: / / le .utah.gov/asp/audio/ 
index.asp?House=H. 
When Senator David Gladwell introduced the bill to the Utah Senate, he 
further explained that this amendment was intended to ensure that rule 11 could not 
serve as the basis for withdrawing a plea. Senator Gladwell explained that although 
rule 11 requires a judge to 
recite all of the rights that a defendant would give up if the defendant 
were to plead guilty, . . . the only thing the constitution requires is that 
a plea be made knowingly and voluntarily. Hence, the statute itself 
will be changed to simply show that the court may allow a defendant 
to withdraw his or her plea upon a showing that it was not knowingly 
and voluntarily made. 
Senator David Gladwell, Floor Debate on H.B. 238,2003 Utah Legislature, March 4, 
2003, audio file located at http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp?House=S. 
In this case, defendant claims that the trial court violated rule 11 during the 
plea colloquy, and he accordingly requests leave to withdraw his plea. Under the 
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current statute, however, rule 11 no longer provides any basis for the requested 
relief. Thus, defendant is incorrect when he claims that the alleged rule 11 violation 
supports his request to withdraw his plea. 
B. The trial court did not commit plain error because defendant's plea 
was not obviously unknowing and involuntary. In addition, 
defendant did not suffer any prejudice from the alleged error. 
Although defendant incorrectly bases his claim on rule 11, defendant also 
concomitantly claims that his plea was unknowing and involuntary due to the 
court's alleged error. Aplt. Br. 18-29. Defendant acknowledges that this claim is 
unpreserved, but nevertheless asks this Court to conclude that there was plain error. 
Aplt. Br. 29-33. 
"' [T]o establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from 
an alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the 
following: (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful/77 State v. Jimenez, 2007 UT App 116, f^ 10,158 
P.3d 1128 (citation omitted). In order to show that an error was harmful, the 
defendant must demonstrate a "'reasonable probability that, but for [the] errors, he 
[or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" 
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 22,95 P.3d 276 (citation omitted). Thus, the error "must 
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have 'affected the outcome of the plea process/" which includes a showing that, 
"'but for' the alleged error, [defendant] would not have pled guilty." Id. 
Defendant's claim should be rejected for three reasons. First, the record 
shows that the trial court complied with rule 11; as a result, there is a presumption 
that defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary. Second, defendant has not 
shown that there was obvious error in this case, where the trial court fully complied 
with rule 11, and where defendant repeatedly informed the court that he 
understood the elements of the crime to which he was pleading guilty. Third, even 
if this alleged error should have been obvious, the record also does not support 
defendant's claim that he would not have pleaded guilty but for the error. 
1. This Court should presume that defendant's plea was 
knowing and voluntary because the trial court complied with 
rule 11. 
As explained above, a rule 11 violation by itself no longer provides a basis for 
withdrawing a guilty plea. But this is not to say that rule 11 has no place in the 
current withdrawal analysis. 
When introducing the 2003 amendment to the Utah House of Representatives, 
Representative Katherine Bryson stated that rule 11 would now act as a "safe 
harbor" against subsequent motions to withdraw guilty pleas. Representative 
Katherine Bryson, Floor Debate on H.B. 238, 2003 Utah Legislature, February 28, 
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2003, audio file located at http:// le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp?House=H. 
When introducing the bill to the Utah Senate, Senator Gladwell explained what this 
meant. According to Senator Gladwell, ''rule 11 is still in force. Judges will still use 
rule 11 to identify those rights given up by a defendant and it will continue to be a 
safe harbor if... all of those rights are accurately recited/' Senator David Gladwell, 
Floor Debate on H.B. 238,2003 Utah Legislature, March 4,2003, audio file located at 
ht tp: / / le .utah.gov/asp/audio/index. asp?House=S. 
The sponsors' joint description of rule 11 as a "safe harbor provision" was 
significant A safe harbor "affords protection from liability or penalty." Black's 
Law Dictionary, Safe Harbor (8th ed. 2004). As explained above, the 2003 
amendment was expressly designed to prevent defendants from withdrawing a 
guilty plea based only on technical rule 11 violations. Thus, the clear implication 
was that while rule 11 violations would no longer support withdrawal of a plea, rule 
11 compliance would still "afford[ ] protection" for the plea if the plea was attacked 
on other grounds. Black's Law Dictionary, Safe Harbor (8th ed. 2004). 
This suggestion is consistent with Utah courts' longstanding treatment of rule 
11. As explained above, the knowing and voluntary standard is not dependant on 
strict rule 11 compliance. See Stilling, 856 P.2d at 671; Salazar, 851 P.2d at 991-92. But 
even under the pre-2003 cases, the supreme court has held that a trial court's rule 11 
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compliance creates a presumption that the plea was entered knowingly and 
voluntarily. See State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, f 22, 26 P.3d 203; State v. Gamblin, 
2000 UT 44, Tf 11,1 P.3d 1108. Thus, while a trial court's rule 11 violation no longer 
provides a basis for withdrawing a guilty plea, a trial court's rule 11 compliance still 
protects the validity of the plea by creating a presumption that the plea was 
knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
During the proceeding below, defendant expressly stipulated that the trial 
court had complied with rule 11 prior to accepting his plea. When defendant filed 
his motion to withdraw his plea, he only argued that the plea should be withdrawn 
based on the alterations to the plea agreement and the filing of the retaliation 
charge. R. 3971 at 127-28. But he never claimed that the trial court had violated rule 
11, either in the letters he personally mailed to the court following his plea, or in the 
motion that he filed after obtaining new counsel. R. 3971 at 101-07,127-28. 
The trial court subsequently held a hearing on defendant's motion. At the 
beginning of that hearing, the prosecutor sought confirmation that rule 11 was not 
at issue, thus leading to the following exchange: 
[Prosecutor]: And your Honor, it's also my understanding that the 
defendant is not challenging that the plea was taken in compliance 
with Rule 11, that he is merely going for the fact that the plea was 
changed, what he thought it was, but that the plea colloquy that the 
23 
Court went through and the plea form that was submitted and that he 
signed was, in fact, accurate and taken in accordance with Rule 11. 
[Defense counsel]: From —from my perspective, that's correct, your 
Honor. That was never an allegation that Mr. Moa made to me. 
R.3971 at227: 7. 
Given this stipulation, the prosecutor did not address the question of whether 
rule 11 had been followed, either during her opening argument or during her 
questioning of defendant's previous counsel. R. 3971 at 227: 7-18. During closing 
arguments, the prosecutor then argued that the court's rule 11 compliance created a 
presumption that the plea was knowing and voluntary. R. 3971 at 227:18. Defense 
did not respond to this by challenging the court's rule 11 compliance, but instead 
again insisted that rule 11 was not at issue: "The only thing I could respond to that, 
Judge, is, clearly, Mr. Moa has never alleged that you didn't follow Rule 11 in this 
case." R.3971 at 227: 19. Given this, the trial court's written ruling ultimately 
concluded that the parties had "stipulated that the plea taken on May 25,2007, was 
taken in compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." R. 3971 
at 195. Defendant did not ever object to that conclusion below. 
Although defendant now claims that the trial court's alleged rule 11 violation 
was plain error, plain error review is unavailable when a party has affirmatively 
waived a claim. "[W]e do not appraise all rulings objected to for the first time on 
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appeal under the plain error doctrine. For example, if trial counsel's actions 
amounted to an active, as opposed to a passive, waiver of an objection, we may 
decline to consider the claim of plain error." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,158 (Utah 
1989). As explained above, defendant repeatedly stated that rule 11 was not an 
issue during the proceedings below. This stipulation had a very practical 
consequence, insofar as it led the prosecutor to refrain from presenting evidence on 
the point during the hearing on the motion to withdraw. Defendant's rule 11 claim 
is therefore barred by the doctrine of invited error.6 
6
 In any event, the record shows that the trial court had a thorough discussion 
with defendant prior to accepting the plea, thereby supporting defendant's 
stipulation. Prior to accepting defendant's plea, the court ensured that defendant 
understood the crime to which he was pleading (R. 3971 at 226: 2-4), his obligations 
with respect to AP&P (R. 3971 at 226: 2-4), and the process by which the original 
information was being amended (R. 3971 at 226: 5). The court confirmed that 
defendant was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol, that defendant was 
not receiving treatment for any illness, and that defendant was sufficiently educated 
to understand the proceedings. R. 3971 at 226: 6. The court ensured that defendant 
understood the factual predicate for the offense. R. 3971 at 226: 6. The court then 
conducted a thorough rule 11 colloquy, during which it advised defendant of the 
presumption of innocence, his right to plead not guilty, his right to a speedy public 
trial before a fair, unbiased, impartial jury, the State's burden of proof, defendant's 
right to appointed counsel, his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, his 
right to remain silent, and his right to appeal. R. 3971 at 226: 7-8. 
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In sum, the record shows that the trial court complied with rule 11 when it 
accepted defendant's plea. As a result, this Court should presume that defendant's 
plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
2. There was no obvious error in this case, where the trial court 
fully complied with rule 11, and where defendant repeatedly 
informed the court that he understood the elements of the 
crime to which he was pleading guilty. 
A defendant cannot obtain relief under the plain error doctrine by simply 
showing that the trial court erred; instead, a defendant can only obtain relief by 
showing that the trial court committed an error that"should have been obvious to 
the trial court." Jimenez, 2007 UT App 116, % 10. Although defendant now claims 
that he did not understand the elements of the crime at the time of his plea, Aplt. Br. 
20-29, the record does not support this claim, let alone show that the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court. 
When a defendant claims that a plea was unknowing and involuntary, a 
"court considering such a claim is not limited to the record of the plea hearing." 
Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992. Instead, compliance with rule 11 "shall be determined by 
examining the record as a whole." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(1). Additionally, "the 
constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record 
accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were 
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explained to the defendant by his own competent counsel.'7 Bradslmw v. Stumpf, 545 
U.S. 175, 183 (2005). Thus, "[w]here a defendant is represented by competent 
counsel, the court may usually rely on that counsel's assurance that the defendant 
has been properly informed of the nature and elements of the charge to which he is 
pleading guilty." Id.; see also Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976) (noting 
that "even without such express representation, it may be appropriate to presume 
that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in 
sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit") . 
Defendant was originally charged with three counts of aggravated assault, 
but ultimately pleaded to one count of discharging a firearm from a vehicle. R. 3971 
at 1-3, 71-72. Defendant signed a statement in support of his plea. That statement 
not only identified the crime at issue by name, but it also listed the specific code 
provision in two different places. R. 3971 at 75-76. Immediately above one such 
reference, defendant stated: "I understand the nature and the elements ofcrime(s) to 
which I am pleading guilty (or no contest)." R. 3971 at 76 (emphasis added). 
Defendant then twice confirmed that he was "admitting that [he] committed the 
crimes listed above." R. 3971 at 76, 78. 
At the plea hearing, Manny Garcia explained that although he was not 
defendant's attorney when the deal was negotiated, he had discussed the plea with 
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defendant. R. 3971 at 226: 5. Garcia explained that while James Valdez "had 
already arranged this . . . I just reiterated it all and have gone over it again" with 
defendant. R. 3971 at 226: 5. Defendant then agreed that those conversations had 
actually occurred. R. 3971 at 226: 6. In the subsequent hearing on defendant's 
motion to withdraw his plea, Garcia reiterated that he had discussed the charge 
with defendant prior to defendant's plea: 
Q: Did you go over that form with Mr. Moa? 
A: I did. 
Q: On May 25th of this year? 
A: I did. 
Q: Specifically addressing tlie clwrge of discltarging a firearm? 
A: Yes. 
R. 3971 at 227: 11-12 (emphasis added). In denying defendant's motion, the trial 
court accordingly stated that he was "impressed with Mr. Garcia's efforts to make 
sure that his client understood what was going on." R. 3971 at 227: 21. 
The plea hearing transcript further confirms that defendant understood the 
charge to which he was pleading. At the beginning of that hearing, the prosecutor 
reiterated that defendant was pleading to "Discharge of a Firearm, 3rd Degree 
Felony." R. 3971 at 226:1. The prosecutor and defense counsel agreed that that crime 
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was set fortli in Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-508. R. 3971 at 226: 4-5. Prior to 
accepting the plea, the court then determined that defendant was pleading to the 
variant set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-508(2)(b), which occurs when a 
defendant fires toward a building: lo# 
THE COURT: So as I understand what you said is he will be pleading 
guilty to a 3rd Degree Felony, Unlawful Discharge of a Firearm. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Toward a building, yes. 
THE COURT: Toward a building and the other charges will be 
dismissed; is that correct? 
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes. 
R. 3971 at 226:2. By statute, that variant of the crime requires the defendant to have 
the "intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable 
structure/7 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b). 
Thus, although the record shows that trial court did not specifically recite all 
of the elements of the crime during the plea hearing, the record shows that 
defendant understood what he was pleading to. Two attorneys discussed the plea 
agreement with defendant, defendant's agreement repeatedly identified the crime to 
which defendant was pleading, and defendant's current attorney "specifically 
address [ed] the charge of discharging a firearm" with defendant prior to the plea. 
R. 3971 at 227: 11-12. Moreover, the trial court conducted a thorough rule 11 
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colloquy with defendant prior to accepting his plea, and defendant submitted a 
sworn statement to the court declaring that he understood "the nature and tlie 
elements of crime(s) to which" he was pleading. R. 3971 at 76 (emphasis added). 
As discussed above, defendant can only prevail on this claim if he shows that 
there was an error in this case and that the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court. In addition, this claim is evaluated in light of the rule 11-based 
presumption that the plea was knowing and voluntary. Given defendant's 
discussions with counsel, his sworn statement, and his interactions with the court at 
the plea hearing, this Court should reject defendant's claim that this plea was 
obviously unknowing and involuntary. 
3. Even if the trial court committed obvious error, defendant's 
plain error claim should still be rejected because defendant 
did not suffer any harm. 
In order to prevail on a plain error claim, a defendant must also show that the 
error was harmful. Jimenez, 2007 UT App 116, f^ 10. In order to show that an alleged 
error was harmful, the defendant must show that there was a "'reasonable 
probability that, but for [the] errors, he [or she] would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial.'" Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 22 (citation omitted). 
Thus, the error "must have 'affected the outcome of the plea process,'" which 
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includes a showing that, "'but for' the alleged error, [defendant] would not have 
pled guilty." Id. 
In this case, even if this error should have been obvious to the trial court, the 
record still does not support defendant's claim that he would not have pleaded had 
he understood the intent element of the crime at issue. 
Defendant and a co-defendant were both initially charged with three second 
degree felonies. R. 3971 at 1-3. The State ultimately offered both defendants the 
same deal: plead no contest to the third degree felony of discharging a firearm from 
a vehicle; in exchange, the State would recommend a suspended sentence of 0-5 
years in prison and the State would also agree to not bring additional charges on 
any related case. R. 3971 at 227: 4,12. This was a good deal for defendant, and it 
saved him from potentially facing years in prison if he were convicted of the three 
second degree felonies at issue. 
As explained above, however, the deal was amended when the State insisted 
that defendant serve an additional period in jail to equalize his sentence with that of 
his co-defendant R. 3971 at 227:12-14. Under the amended deal, defendant agreed 
to a 3-5 year suspended sentence, rather than a 0-5 year sentence, and he also agreed 
to submit to a PSI prior to sentencing. R. 3971 at 227:12-14. 
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The reason for this change is well established in the record. During the initial 
plea hearing, defendant asked the court for confirmation that "I'll be released today 
for sure?" R. 3971 at 226: 14. During the hearing on defendant's motion to 
withdraw his plea, Garcia explained that defendant only agreed to the amended 
deal —and thus the pronounced enhancement to his potential prison sentence— 
because defendant "wanted to get out of jail that day." R. 3971 at 227:12; see also R. 
3971 at 227:13 ("He wanted to get out of jail that day and so I went back and talked 
to Vince about what deal could we make so that he could get out that day."). During 
cross-examination, Garcia again explained that defendant was going to accept the 
original deal "until he realized he wasn't going to get out that day and then that's 
when the deal changed." R. 3971 at 227:17. Thus: 
Q: So the only reason this changed, as far as you're concerned was so 
you could get Charles out of jail that— that day of the plea? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that's why the change occurred? 
A: Yes. 
R. 3971 at 227: 17. Garcia again reiterated this point at a separate hearing, 
explaining that the amended plea was "exactly what he was anticipating, and really 
his biggest concern . . . was he wanted to get out of jail." R. 3971 at 234:17-18. 
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The record therefore demonstrates that defendant did not accept the amended 
deal because it fit his understanding of what he had done. Rather, defendant 
accepted this particular plea because it not only saved him from potentially 
spending years in prison, but also because it allowed him to be released from prison 
on May 25, 2007. Defendant's specific release date ultimately proved to be the 
critical point, not the intent element of the crime to which he was pleading. 
In response, defendant nevertheless argues that his pro se motions to 
withdraw his plea in the weeks following the plea hearing show that he would not 
have pleaded no contest to the offense had he been properly informed of the 
elements. Aplt Br. 31. While the record does show that defendant was concerned 
about his plea following the hearing, the record does not support his claim that this 
concern had anything to do with the elements of the crime to which he had pleaded. 
In those pro se motions, defendant never mentioned the elements of the crime. R. 
3971 at 101-09. Instead, defendant only complained about (1) the retaliation charge 
that had been filed against him, and (2) the alterations to the plea agreement. R. 
3971 at 101-06. 
The prosecution subsequently dropped the retaliation charge, however, and 
defendant has not raised any issue relating to it on appeal. R. 3971 at 227: 6-7; R. 
3971 at 234: 20. That charge is therefore not at issue. 
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With respect to the plea alterations, defendant not only agreed to those 
alterations, but he also received a direct benefit from them. As explained above, 
those alterations ultimately allowed defendant to be released from jail on March 25, 
which was the most critical term for him. R. 3971 at 227:17. 
More importantly, those alterations did not purport to change the underlying 
offense; instead, those alterations only changed the scope of the suspended sentence. 
Thus, even if it were true that defendant did not consent to those alterations, the 
particular concerns expressed in the letters still had nothing to do with the elements 
of the crime, and therefore do not support his claim on appeal that he would not 
have pleaded guilty had he understood those elements. 
Defendant next suggests that because he had concerns about the intent 
element in case -4352, that supports his claim that he would not have pleaded to the 
crime in case -3971 had he understood the elements. Aplt. Br. 31-32. This argument 
assumes too much. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the fact that defendant was concerned about 
the intent element in case -4352 does not automatically mean that defendant was 
likewise concerned in case -3971. The reason for this is that these two pleas were 
taken under very different circumstances. Defendant pleaded no contest in case 
-3971 on May 25, 2007. R. 3971 at 226:1-15. At that time, the agreement was that 
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defendant would receive a suspended sentence. R. 3971 at 226:1-2. By the time of 
sentencing, however, the court had received the PSI, which contained a detailed 
recitation of defendant's criminal background, and defendant had also been arrested 
in case -4352. When defendant appeared for sentencing in case -3971 on October 
29, 2007, the court therefore sentenced him to prison. R. 3971 at 234: 29-35. 
Defendant did not plead guilty in case -4352 until November 13, 2007, 
however, which was two weeks after he had been sent to prison in case -3971. 
Thus, when defendant pleaded guilty in case -4352, he was in a radically different 
position than he was in when he pleaded no contest in case -3971. While the earlier 
plea had presumed that defendant would not be sent to prison, this subsequent plea 
was entered while defendant was already in prison. Defendant would have 
understood that he was facing pronounced possibility of serving prison time based 
on the plea in case -4352, which would have therefore given him a greater incentive 
to scrutinize the exact details of that plea. 
Moreover, even if defendant had been in a similar position when he pleaded 
guilty in the two separate cases, his decision to plead guilty in the second case 
refutes his claim that he would not have pleaded guilty in the first case. 
As explained above, defendant was charged with being the driver during a 
drive-by shooting in case -4352. R. 4352 at 2-6. During the plea hearing in that case, 
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defendant admitted that he was driving the car with a friend, and he also admitted 
that he "made a U-turn to shoot in there." R. 4352 at 121: 9. Upon further 
questioning, however, defendant denied that the reason he had driven "over there 
with the guy with the gun was to intimidate somebody." R. 4352 at 121: 10. 
Defendant explained: "It wasn't to intimidate. It was just discharge the firearm." 
R. 4352 at 121:11. Although the trial court then informed defendant that it would 
"infer intimidation from that" and still enter a plea of guilty, defendant did not 
object. R. 4352 at 121:11. Instead, defendant agreed to plead to guilty. R. 4352 at 
121:11-12. 
Thus, although this record does show that defendant was concerned about the 
intent element in case -4352, it also shows that this concern was not serious enough 
to prevent him from pleading guilty to the crime. Thus, insofar as defendant was 
not concerned enough about the intent element in case -4352 to actually reject the 
plea agreement, there is no basis for concluding that that same level of concern 
would have prevented him from likewise pleading guilty in case -3971. This is 
particularly true where defendant got what he bargained for in case -3971: 
immediate release from jail. 
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Defendant therefore has not shown that he was prejudiced by the alleged 
error, and this Court should therefore reject defendant's request to overturn his plea 
based on plain error. 
C. Defendant has not shown that Manny Garcia provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel by failing to adequately investigate this case. 
Defendant also claims that his unpreserved claim can be reviewed for 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant specifically argues that Manny Garcia 
failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into the merits of his claim, and that this 
failure then prevented Garcia from ensuring that defendant understood the 
elements of the crime. Aplt. Br. 33-37. 
In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant 
must show (1) "that counsel's performance was objectively deficient," and (2) that 
"a reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would 
have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial." State v. Marble, 2007 UT App 82, 
f 8,157 P.3d 371. Defendant has not satisfied either prong. 
First, defendant has not shown that Garcia performed deficiently. In order to 
show deficient performance, a defendant "must overcome the strong presumption 
that his trial counsel rendered adequate assistance, by persuading the court that 
37 
there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsels actions/' Id. at f^ 11 (quotations and 
citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
In this case, defendant claims that Manny Garcia "did not separately 
investigate the nature and elements of the offense or the factual basis/7 Aplt. Br. 35. 
As support for this claim, defendant points out that Garcia (1) used a plea statement 
that had been prepared by prior counsel, and (2) could not name the specific code 
section at issue when asked for it during the plea hearing. Aplt. Br. 36. 
As a threshold matter, defendant is incorrect when he suggests that there was 
something improper about Garcia's decision to initially rely on the work performed 
by James Valdez. Contrary to defendant's claim, successor counsel is not required 
to start from scratch when assuming representation midway through a case. In State 
v. Classon, this Court recognized while the Sixth Amendment is violated when "no 
lawyer accepts actual responsibility for preparation and defense of the case," this 
does not mean that "more than one lawyer may not fulfill this responsibility 
simultaneously, or sequentially/' 935 P.2d 524, 534 (Utah App. 1997) (emphasis 
added). In United States v. Ciancaglini, a federal district court similarly held that "if 
evidence can be quickly gathered from other sources, such as other defense counsel 
in the matter, less personal investigation by counsel is not dispositive" to an 
ineffective assistance claim. 945 F.Supp. 813, 819 (E.D.Pa. 1996); see also Crane v. 
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State, 670 S.E.2d 123, 125-26 (Ga. App. 2008) (denying a Sixth Amendment claim 
where successor counsel had become "familiar" with the case by reviewing "the 
trial preparation work performed" by defendant's original counsel). 
In any event, although it is true that Garcia used a plea statement that had 
been prepared by James Valdez, it is not true that Garcia failed to conduct any 
independent investigation of the case. During the hearing below, Garcia testified 
that he had discussed the deal with James Valdez before the plea hearing to confirm 
that the plea statement was accurate. R. 3971 at 227:12. Garcia also stated that he 
discussed the plea with defendant in order to make sure that defendant understood 
the deal. R. 3971 at 227:11-12. After defendant explained that he "wanted to get out 
of jail that day," rather than serving additional time, Garcia went back to the 
prosecutor and confirmed that the prosecutor would not agree to defendant's 
immediate release. R. 3971 at 227:12. Garcia "did some calculating" to verify the 
prosecutor's understanding of how long defendant had served, after which Garcia 
personally negotiated the modified deal that ultimately allowed defendant to be 
released immediately. R. 3971 at 227:12-14. 
Although defendant now points out that Garcia could not remember the 
precise statutory section to which defendant was pleading no contest, Aplt. Br. 36, 
the record demonstrates that Garcia was well aware of the underlying charge. As 
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discussed above, that statutory provision was identified twice in defendant's plea 
statement, defendant signed a statement saying that he had reviewed the statement 
with Garcia, and Garcia later specifically testified that he had not only reviewed that 
plea agreement with defendant, but also that he had discussed the specific charges 
with defendant. R. 3971 at 75-76, 80; 3971 at 226: 5; 3971 at 227:11-12. 
Moreover, defendant's claim relies on a selective recitation of the facts 
surrounding defense counsel's memory lapse. At the plea hearing, the parties 
explained the plea to the court. At that point, the court asked counsel "[w]hat 
section will he be charged under, do you know?" R. 3971 at 226:4. The prosecutor 
responded that it would be "[sjection 76-10,1 believe it's 508, isn't it counsel?" R. 
3971 at 226: 4-5. As indicated in defendant's brief, Garcia responded by saying "I 
honestly don't know." R. 3971 at 226: 5. Garcia's next sentence, however, showed 
that this was a momentary memory lapse, not evidence of faulty preparation: "I 
looked at it a few days ago and I did not write it down, Judge." R. 3971 at 226: 5. 
Thus, defendant only tells part of the story when he suggests that Garcia "did 
not know" what section defendant was pleading no contest to violating. Aplt. Br. 
36. What the record actually says is that although Garcia reviewed the code section 
a few days before the hearing, discussed the case and the agreement with James 
Valdez, reviewed the charges and plea agreement with defendant, and personally 
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negotiated a series of modifications to the plea agreement itself, he had a 
momentary memory lapse during the hearing. This isolated moment simply does 
not establish that Garcia failed to review defendant's claim, nor does it overcome 
the strong presumption that Garcia acted competently. 
Second, defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by either of the 
alleged errors. "Where a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, he or she must show 'a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's errors, he [or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial/" Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah 1994) (quoting 
Hill v. Lockliart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Therefore, counsel's deficient performance 
must have "'affected the outcome of the plea process.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
As discussed above, however, defendant's plea in this case was based on the 
State's initial sentencing concessions, as well as its subsequent willingness to 
approve defendant's immediate release. Thus, regardless of whether Garcia had 
conducted an independent examination of the underlying facts and the precise 
nature of this charge, the record still demonstrates that defendant would have 
pleaded no contest in order to obtain his immediate release. Defendant's ineffective 
assistance claim should therefore be rejected. 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT ORDERED DEFENDANT'S SENTENCES IN CASE -4352 TO 
RUN CONSECUTIVELY WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH THE 
SENTENCE IN CASE -3971 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the 
sentences in case -4352 to run consecutively to each other and to the sentences 
imposed in case -3971. Aplt. Br. 37-45. Defendant specifically claims that the trial 
court abused its discretion by (1) failing to properly consider the number of victims 
in this case, and (2) improperly considering a prior shooting. Aplt. Br. 37-45. Both 
claims should be rejected. 
A. The record does not support defendant's claim that the trial court 
improperly considered the number of victims. 
Defendant first claims that the trial court failed to properly consider the 
number of victims prior to imposing consecutive sentences. Aplt. Br. 37-45. This 
claim should be rejected. 
A trial court's decision regarding consecutive or concurrent sentences is 
governed by Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401 (West 2004). Under § 76-3-401(2), a 
court is required to "consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the 
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant7' when making this decision. 
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A defendant bears the burden of establishing error when he claims that the 
trial court improperly weighed the § 76-3-401(2) factors. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, 
1 ! 11,16, 40 P.3d 626; State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, % 28, 82 P.3d 1167. A 
defendant does not satisfy this burden by simply showing that a trial court was 
silent regarding a particular factor. State v. Valdez, 2008 UT App 329, % 8,194 P.3d 
195. Instead, sentences are affirmed as long as information regarding the contested 
factor was properly before the trial court. See State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 652 
(Utah App. 1997). Thus, if the record shows that the factor was discussed in the PSI 
and that the trial court reviewed the PSI prior to sentencing, that is sufficient to 
show that the trial court properly considered the factor. See Helms, 2002 UT 12, <[  13; 
Valdez, 2008 UT App 329, % 8; Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, ^ 30-31. 
In this case, the PSI specifically discussed the number of victims, and the PSI 
was specifically discussed at sentencing. R. 4352 at 122: 3-4; 4352 at PSI: 6. The 
record therefore shows that the trial court considered the number of victims prior to 
sentencing defendant to consecutive sentences in case -4352. 
Despite this, defendant claims that the court did not"properly" consider the 
number of victims because the prosecutor stated that the "whole neighborhood" 
was the victim during the sentencing hearing. Aplt. Br. 40. This claim should be 
rejected for three reasons. 
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First, there was nothing improper about the prosecutor's statement. 
Defendant drove into a Salt Lake City neighborhood at 5 a.m., after which one of his 
passengers began shooting from the vehicle at a neighborhood house. R. 4352 at 
PSI: 3. Officers later found "several bullet holes in a vehicle" that was parked in 
front of a home. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4. 
From these facts, it is clear this was not a targeted crime. Defendant's 
companion did not aim at a particular person, nor did he fire from a stable vantage 
point during daylight hours. Instead, defendant's companion fired multiple rounds 
into the dark from a moving vehicle. These stray bullets could have hit anyone from 
the neighborhood who happened to be in the wrong place at this very wrong time. 
Such a shooting would have had an undeniably striking impact—not only on the 
owner of the vehicle that defendant's companion actually hit, but also on all the 
other people in the neighborhood who walk those same streets and would now be 
left wondering how to protect themselves and their children the next time defendant 
or his friends decided to fire multiple shots from a moving vehicle. 
Second, even if the prosecutor's statement was somehow improper, 
defendant's claim fails because he has not shown that the trial court actually 
considered that statement as a basis for its sentencing decision. As indicated above, 
"'the burden is on [the defendant] to show that the trial court did not properly 
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consider all the factors in section 76-3-401 (4)/" Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, % 28 
(quoting Helms, 2002 UT 12, f^ 16). This burden extends to cases in which a 
defendant claims that the trial court considered improper information. In State v. 
Alfatlawi, for example, the defendant claimed that his consecutive sentences were 
improper because the trial court had considered his ''race and nationality during the 
sentencing hearing." 2006 UT App 511, f 48,153 P.3d 804. This Court rejected that 
claim, however, because the defendant had "failed to demonstrate that the trial 
court was actually motivated by bias in its sentencing determination." Id. at % 49. 
Thus, there is a difference between a trial court simply being aware of a 
statement and a trial court actively relying on the statement as a basis for 
sentencing. While defendant correctly notes that appellate courts assume that a trial 
court considered a statutory factor if it is set forth in the PSI, Aplt. Br. 42, appellate 
courts also expressly allow trial courts to disregard individual factors if the 
circumstances of an individual case warrant it. Under this rule, trial courts retain 
the discretion to attach different weight to the different factors, and trial courts are 
expressly allowed to place one factor over the all the others if the circumstances 
warrant. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 2006 UT App 420, ^ 31, 147 P.3d 497. Thus, 
"[o]ne factor in mitigation or aggravation may weigh more than several factors on 
the opposite scale." State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188,192 (Utah 1990). 
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In this case, although the trial court clearly heard the prosecutor refer to the 
"whole neighborhood" as the victim of the crime, R. 4352 at 122: 6, the trial court 
never referred to that statement during the sentencing hearing. R. 4352 at 122:1-7. 
Instead, the court only offered one explanation for its sentence: that defendant was 
"an extreme danger to any community that he happens to be in." R. 4352 at 122: 6. 
This was a clear reference to defendant's character, which is also a factor under § 76-
3-401(2). Thus, even if the court did consider the prosecutor's statement regarding 
the number of victims, that statement ultimately proved irrelevant because the court 
based its decision on a different factor entirely. Defendant is therefore incorrect 
when he claims that the trial court improperly considered the number of victims. 
Third, even if the trial court did improperly consider the prosecutor's 
statement, defendant still has not shown that there was an abuse of discretion. "The 
imposition of a sentence rests entirely within the discretion of the trial court, within 
the limits prescribed by law." Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651 (quotations and citation 
omitted). "Abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge in 
sentencing were inherently unfair or if the judge imposed a clearly excessive 
sentence." State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996) (quotations and 
citation omitted). It is therefore settled that a court only abuses its discretion when 
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"no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." Id.; accord 
State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, % 12, 84 P.3d 854; Schweitzer, 943 R2d at 651. 
As discussed above, the court sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences 
because of its conclusion that defendant was "an extreme danger to any community 
that he happens to be in." R. 4352 at 122: 6. This conclusion was amply supported 
by the record. Defendant admitted that he was the driver during a drive-by 
shooting. R. 4352 at 121: 9. After a concerned neighbor followed him out of the 
neighborhood and called police, defendant led officers on a high speed chase at 
speeds that reached 125 to 130 mph. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4. During that chase, 
defendant intentionally rammed his car into a police car, and he was only stopped 
after officers performed the pit maneuver on him. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4. Rather than 
submitting at that point, defendant ran away, and he was only apprehended after 
officers tased him twice. R. 4352 at PSI: 3-4. 
While this crime alone showed that defendant was an "extreme danger to any 
community that he happens to be in," defendant's criminal history only amplified 
that conclusion. R. 4352 at 122: 6. Defendant committed this crime while awaiting 
sentencing on the charges in case -3971. As explained above, that crime occurred 
when defendant and his companions fired into a crowd of people in a parking lot. 
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But this is not all. As set forth in the PSI, defendant had also been involved in 
17 criminal incidents since 1997. R. 4352 at PSI: 6-7. In fact, his criminal history in 
Utah has been serious enough that he was at one time officially listed as Public 
Enemy Number One. R. 4352 at PSI: 6. In addition, at the time of these incidents, 
defendant was a fugitive from charges in Washington state. R. 4352 at PSI: 6. After 
being jailed on these charges, defendant was charged with two different jailhouse 
rule infractions that occurred while awaiting sentencing: in the first, defendant was 
charged with disorderly conduct; in the second, he was charged with not following 
orders from jail staff. R. 4352 at PSI: 5. 
In State v. Nuttall, this Court held that a trial court may order consecutive 
sentences to "protect society from an individual deemed to be a danger to the 
community." 861 P.2d 454,458 (Utah App. 1993). In Montoya, this Court therefore 
affirmed a court's decision to order consecutive sentences where a known gang 
member committed a violent crime while on probation. 929 P.3d at 358-60. 
Given the indiscriminate, violent nature of this crime, defendant's willingness 
to participate in a drive-by shooting while awaiting sentencing on another charge, 
defendant's willingness to assault a police officer during a high speed chase, and 
defendant's extensive criminal history, defendant simply cannot show that no 
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reasonable person would have concluded that consecutive sentences were 
appropriate. Defendant's claim should be rejected. 
B. The record does not support defendant's claim that the trial court 
improperly considered the prior shooting. 
Defendant next claims that the trial court abused its discretion "by considering 
information that was not reasonably relevant or reliable." Aplt. Br. 41. According 
to defendant, the trial court "considered other incidents described by the 
prosecutor," including a prior shooting in which a young neighborhood girl had 
been hit. Aplt. Br. 41. This claim should be rejected for two reasons. 
First, as with the comment discussed above in Point II. A, the record does not 
support defendant's claim that the trial court actually considered this comments. 
The trial court did not refer to it during the sentencing hearing. R. 4352 at 122:1-7. 
Instead, the trial court only referred to the fact that defendant was "an extreme 
danger to any community that he happens to be in." R. 4352 at 122: 6. Although 
defendant speculates that this statement may have been a reference to the 
prosecutor's comment, nothing in the record supports that speculation. Absent such 
evidence, defendant has not satisfied his burden of showing that this ruling was 
actually based on improper information. Defendant's claim should be rejected for 
this reason alone. 
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Second, even if the trial court did rely on this statement, and even if it was not 
reasonably reliable, the sentence was still appropriate because the evidence that was 
before the court supported the sentence. In State v. Scott, the defendant similarly 
claimed that his sentence was based on unreliable information. 2008 UT App 68, 
f 12,180 P.3d 774. Although this Court ultimately concluded that the challenged 
information was sufficiently reliable, this Court affirmed the sentence because "the 
remaining cumulative evidence clearly supports Defendant's sentence." Id. In 
Alfatlawi, this Court likewise concluded that the defendant had "failed to 
demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the alleged errors'7 because the admissible 
evidence still"weigh[ed] heavily in favor of consecutive sentencing." 2006 UT App 
511, | 51. 
As set forth above, the trial court in this case concluded that defendant was an 
extreme danger to the community —a conclusion amply supported by the 
indiscriminate shooting in this case, the indiscriminate shooting in case -3971, the 17 
prior criminal incidents that defendant has been involved with, and the two 
jailhouse infractions that defendant incurred in the months prior to sentencing. 
Thus, even if the trial court had improperly considered the prosecutor's reference to 
a prior shooting, defendant's claim should still be rejected because he has not shown 
that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's improper statement. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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